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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002898

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2015

TAGS: [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [CASC](#) [EG](#)

SUBJECT: EMBASSY CAIRO'S RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 7 TERRORIST BOMBING

REF: A. CAIRO 2799

[B](#). CAIRO 2773

[C](#). CAIRO 2744

[D](#). CAIRO 2743

Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary  
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[1](#). (SBU) Embassy Cairo's immediate response to the April 7 Khan el-Khalili bombing (reftels) included expeditious consular assistance to the three wounded American citizens and their families, the placement of personnel at the crime scene to collect information and assess continuing threats, and the issuance of notifications and guidance to the official and private American communities in Egypt. Within hours of the incident, the Embassy's Regional Medical Office arranged the transfer of the wounded AmCits to a better hospital and maintained close contact with the attending doctors, facilitating communications and bringing in outside specialists as necessary. On April 12, thanks to the coordination of Embassy's Office of Military Cooperation and the Defense Attache's Office, a fully equipped USAF medical evacuation aircraft and crew came to Egypt and transported the wounded Americans to Landstuhl regional medical center in Germany. The Embassy's Emergency Action Committee (EAC), which has met three times since the incident, and the core EAC will convene next on April 17 to review the Mission's security posture and guidance to the American community. End summary.

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First Responders  
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[2](#). (SBU) Shortly after the April 7 terrorist attack in Cairo's Khan el-Khalili tourist bazaar, which occurred at approximately 1745 local Cairo time, Embassy personnel were dispatched to the scene. Three consular officers (along with an Army Foreign Area Officer who was dining with them) proceeded to the scene immediately upon hearing of the attack. They then went to the Hussein hospital where the wounded AmCits, and other bombing victims, were taken. Assisted by RSO LES personnel, Conoffs confirmed the death of AmCit Alex Mirandette and the injury of AmCits Erik Mirandette, Kris Ross, and Michael Kiel Tenhaaf.

[3](#). (SBU) Due to the poor facilities available at the Hussein Hospital, Conoffs began to press immediately for the transfer of the patients to a better hospital. A/LEGATT also proceeded to the hospital and was able to conduct a preliminary interview with the victims. Meanwhile, the Embassy's regional medical office (RMO) was making contacts at the Dar al-Fouad hospital, one of Egypt's best, in a western suburb of Cairo. RMO successfully arranged for two fully equipped ambulances and professional medical crews to transfer the injured AmCits to Dar al-Fouad.

[4](#). (SBU) As Conoffs and RMO worked to address the immediate needs of the injured AmCits, RSO raised the alert level at all U.S. mission facilities and deployed Assistant RSOs to known after-hours concentrations of official Americans. RSO also initiated a dialogue with GOE security contacts to determine the details of the attack and assess the possibility of a near-term repetition. The Charge convened the Embassy's EAC on April 7 at 2030 local Cairo time and the EAC decided to issue a warden message and an alert to the Mission community (ref D).

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The Day(s) After  
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[5](#). (SBU) EAC members worked into the early hours of April 8, gathering information, accounting for mission personnel, and briefing counterparts in Washington. Also early on April 8, RSO coordinated with contacts in Egypt's State Security Investigative Service (SSIS) to gain access to the attack scene. In the morning, RSO, DRSO, and LEGATT, accompanied by SSIS officers, inspected the crime scene. The Charge called a follow-on EAC meeting at midday, April 8, by which time a clearer picture of the incident was emerging (ref C). The meeting factored in information garnered from EAC members'

contacts with various GOE officials, inspection of the crime scene, preliminary interviews with the AmCit victims, and updated information on their medical condition. Having secured verbal privacy act waivers, consular officers notified the AmCits' next of kin.

16. (SBU) Starting April 8, RMO and staff began a series of daily visits to the Dar al-Fuad hospital and worked closely with the attending physicians to ensure the best possible care. When the most seriously injured of the AmCits, Erik Mirandette, became critically ill, RMO pushed for more aggressive treatment. RMO made round-the-clock calls to the attending physicians and outside specialists and stepped up visits to the hospital. A local surgical intervention suggested by RMO may have saved Mirandette's life.

17. (SBU) At the invitation of the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, 11 family members and three church personnel flew to Cairo to be with the injured Americans. The Consular Section worked to facilitate their movements, including helping four of them travel without passports. Consular personnel remained all day at the hospital to assist the injured and their families/friends. On April 10, the Charge convened the full EAC to review threat information and discuss the reaction of the American community (ref B). The EAC decided to maintain the recommendation that Americans avoid areas in Cairo frequented by tourists for a further week (until April 17).

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Investigation  
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18. (C) RSO, LEGATT, and ORA have each been in regular contact with GOE security contacts for updates on the investigation and its findings. Based on their own observations, these offices have also provided Washington agencies with analysis, findings, and notes (septels). As reported ref A, the GOE announced preliminary findings, including the identity of the suicide bomber/perpetrator and his apparent (Jihadist) motives and background, on April 11.

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Public Affairs  
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19. (SBU) The Embassy's Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer (duty press officer at the time of the incident) handled all public affairs dimensions of the Embassy's response. She prepared a special media reaction briefing for the EAC, drafted suggested press guidance for use in Washington, and served as the principal point of contact for the international and Egyptian press covering the incident.

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Medevac  
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10. (SBU) The Embassy's Office of Military Cooperation and Defense Attache, in coordination with the Charge and the Consular section, arranged for a military medical evacuation aircraft to transport the wounded AmCits to Ramstein AFB, Germany. The modalities of this transfer were complex and involved engagement of the GOE by OMC, DAO, and Consular and Political officers; extensive coordination with Washington; and close liaison with the hospital, coordinated by RMO, DAO, and the Consular Section. RMO provided the aircraft's medical crew with a briefing on the condition of the evacuees prior to departure.

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Next Steps  
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11. (SBU) The core EAC will meet again on April 17 to review the Mission's security posture and guidance to the private American community. The Embassy will follow in close detail, and report as appropriate, developments in the GOE's investigation and any legal proceedings it generates. We will review the Consular Information Sheet and modify it (with Department clearance) to reflect the most recent terror attack. In the meantime, core EAC members will constantly review the threat environment and recommend adjustments as necessary.

Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website:  
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo>

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State Department's Classified SIPRNET website.

GRAY